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COMMENT
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO STATUTES
OF REPOSE
by Susan C. Randall
ORT law has undergone a number of plaintiff oriented substantive
and procedural changes in recent years. Substantive changes are nu-
merous. Courts have expanded the concept of legal duty.' Plaintiffs
have succeeded in gaining recognition of new torts and have thereby recov-
ered damages for previously noncompensable injuries. 2 Comparative fault
schemes have liberalized the contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk bars to recovery. 3 Judges have relaxed evidentiary requirements, thus
making plaintiffs' recoveries easier to obtain.4
Liberalization of statutes of limitation represents a corresponding pro-
plaintiff trend in procedural tort law. Legislatures and courts have signifi-
cantly redefined the point at which a cause of action accrues for statute of
limitation purposes. A statute of limitation begins to run when a cause of
1. See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436, 441 (1980) (landlord in
high crime area owes duty to tenants to protect them from third-party trespassers); Nixon v.
Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549-50 (Tex. 1985) (apartment building
owner owes duty to public to secure vacant apartments and is liable to crime victims for failure
to do so); Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309-10 (Tex. 1983) (employer owes duty
to public to protect it from acts of intoxicated employee dismissed from work).
2. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en
banc) (recognizing new tort of negligent infliction of mental distress); accord Corso v. Merrill,
119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300, 307 (1979). The Texas Supreme Court appears on the verge of
creating a new tort based on Dillon v. Legg principles. See Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking,
Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 550-51 (Tex. 1985); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex.
1983); Id. at 255 (Ray, J., concurring); Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 777 n.l (Tex.
1980) (Spears, J., concurring).
3. E.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828-29, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242-43, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 875-76 (1975) (en banc) (adopting a pure comparative fault scheme with no contrib-
utory negligence bar to recovery); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex. 1975)
(abolishing assumption of the risk bar to recovery). Farley abolished assumption of the risk in
light of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon 1973) (recodified as TEX. CiV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ch. 33 (Vernon 1986)), which is a modified comparative fault scheme with a
51% contributory negligence bar to recovery. Id.
4. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972) (lay rather than expert medical testimony held sufficient to establish patient's need
to know in order to give informed consent); Loui v. Oakley, 50 Hawaii 260, 438 P.2d 393, 396-
97 (1968) (plaintiff who received similar injuries from four unrelated auto accidents over sev-
eral-year period need not establish by preponderance of evidence percent of injury attributable
to each defendant to recover).
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action accrues. Traditionally, a cause of action accrued when the negligence
or injury occurred. 5 Many states now apply the discovery rule, which pro-
vides that a cause of action accrues when the injured party first discovers the
damage or when the damage would have been discovered had the party used
due diligence. 6
Certain categories of prospective defendants have reacted to the pro-plain-
tiff trend in procedural law by lobbying for the enactment of statutes of re-
pose.7 Repose statutes shelter legislatively designated groups from property
and personal injury actions after a period of time has elapsed. That time
period is determined by statute and is unrelated to when an accident or dis-
covery of damage occurs. Statutes of repose thus resemble statutes of limita-
tion in that they establish time deadlines within which a plaintiff must bring
an action. The two types of statutes, however, differ significantly in opera-
tion and effect.
Plaintiffs have launched a series of constitutional attacks, most notably on
due process grounds, against statutes of repose. 8 The core of the due process
5. See Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 166-67, 267 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1971) (review of
traditional accrual rule and its inequities); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation,
63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1200 (1950).
6. E.g., Frederick v. Calbio Pharmaceuticals, 89 Cal. App. 3d 49, 53-54, 152 Cal. Rptr.
292, 294-95 (1979); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 197, 293 A.2d 662, 665
(1972); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1984); see also Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio
St. 2d 164, 166-72, 267 N.E.2d 419, 421-23 (1971) (court reviewed reasons for rejecting tradi-
tional rule but declined to adopt discovery rule because of lack of legislative support for the
change). Courts have most frequently adopted the discovery rule in relation to medical mal-
practice suits. See, e.g., McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 666-67 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980) (interpreting Ohio as having adopted discovery rule for
malpractice); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450-51, 173 A.2d 277, 285-86 (1961) (discovery
rule adopted for medical malpractice suits because it is more equitable than time-of-injury
rule); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 922-23 (Tex. 1984) (health care liability statute of
limitation unconstitutional if it bars cause of action before plaintiff reasonably should have
known of the injury). Courts have, however, applied the rule in other contexts as well. See,
e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624, 581 P.2d
197, 200, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 488 (1978) (latent property defects); New Market Poultry Farms
v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 424, 241 A.2d 633, 636-37 (1968) (cause of action for mistake in land
case survey accrued at time discovered, not at time of negligence); ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(b)
(Supp. 1985) (discovery rule applied to latent product defects; statute overruled on other
grounds in Lankford v. Sullivan, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982)); infra text accompanying
notes 119-121.
7. See infra text accompanying note 10; Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So.
2d 725, 726 (Ala. 1983); Kornblut, Statutes of Limitation: An Overview, ARCHITECTURAL
RECORD, Aug. 1975, at 49, 49-50. See also infra text accompanying notes 14-20 for discussion
of factors influencing this prodefendant backlash. See generally Dworkin, Product Liability of
the 1980's: "Repose Is Not the Destiny"of Manufacturers, 61 N.C.L. REV. 33 (1982) (analysis
of rise and possible downfall of product liability statutes of repose).
8. Plaintiffs have challenged statutes of repose on a variety of state constitutional
grounds. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Stat-
utes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579, 600-06 (1981). Although framed in terms of state
constitutional provisions, the majority of these challenges involve federal constitutional ques-
tions of equal protection and due process. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, art. 1, §§ 2, 17. Equal
protection challenges generally concern only specific provisions of construction industry stat-
utes of repose since the statutes typically protect the construction industry without protecting
owners and materialmen. See infra note 11. Courts have invalidated construction industry
statutes of repose on equal protection grounds in: Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568,
571-72 (1973) (statute amended extensively, but again invalidated on equal protection grounds
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challenge involves a conflict between the rationale behind statutes of limita-
tion and the manner of operation of repose statutes.9 The frequency of at-
tacks on the constitutionality of statutes of repose and the differing results of
such attacks suggest that the United States Supreme Court needs to make a
final determination concerning the constitutionality of such statutes.
This Comment focuses on the conflict between policies underlying statutes
of limitation and those underlying statutes of repose in order to explore the
validity of due process challenges to statutes of repose. Discussion first turns
to the history, nature, and purpose of repose statutes. An examination of the
prerequisites for the constitutionality of statutory limitations periods and an
analysis of the ways in which application of repose statutes may violate these
constitutional requirements then follows. The Comment concludes that stat-
utes of repose become most vulnerable to constitutional challenge when they
operate as abbreviated statutes of limitation and extinguish plaintiffs' vested
rights in causes of action, but that various methods are available to conform
statutes of repose to constitutional due process requirements.
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND STATUTES OF REPOSE
A. Background of Repose Statutes
In recent years the majority of state legislatures have passed repose stat-
utes favoring two groups of potential defendants. Construction industry
professionals such as architects, engineers, and builders compose the first
group protected by statutes of repose; manufacturers and vendors constitute
the second group. The statutes benefiting these two groups are substantially
similar in purpose and content.
During the late 1950s the American Institute of Architects, the National
Society of Professional Engineers, and the Associated General Contractors
of America launched lobbying campaigns in each state' 0 for the purpose of
gaining legislative adoption of statutes of repose designed to protect mem-
bers of the construction industry. I I Wisconsin adopted the first such statute
in Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 65 Hawaii 26, 647 P.2d 276, 288 (1982)); Skinner v.
Anderson, 38 I11. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1967); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. All
Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 660 P.2d 995, 997-98 (1983); Henderson Clay Prods., Inc. v. Edgar
Wood & Assoc., Inc., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174, 175 (1982); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C.
227, 241 S.E.2d 739, 740-41 (1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382,
225 N.W.2d 454, 459-60 (1975); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 825-31 (Wyo.
1980). Lengthy discussions of equal protection challenges to repose statutes may be found in
Dworkin, supra note 7, at 54-61, and McGovern, supra note 8, at 606-10.
9. Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints for
Non-action, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 361, 372-79 (1969).
10. Kornblut, supra note 7, at 49; see Jackson v. Mannesman Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d
725, 726 (Ala. 1983); Rogers, The Constitutionality of Alabama's Statute of Limitations for
Construction Litigation: The Legislature Tries Again, 11 CUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1980).
11. Statutes of repose designed to protect the construction industry generally provide im-
munity for only certain specified types of potential defendants, leaving others vulnerable to suit
after the repose statute has run. Most of these statutes single out architects, engineers, and
contractors, but either explicitly or implicitly exclude from protection owners and material-
men. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-237 (Supp. 1985); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 16.008 (1986). Because the statutes protect only certain groups of defendants, plaintiffs have
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
in 1961.12 By 1985 forty-six states and the District of Columbia had adopted
special statutes limiting the liability of those involved in designing and erect-
ing improvements to real property.13
The impetus for the construction industry's efforts to gain protective legis-
lation arose from three legal developments that expanded the potential liabil-
ity of those involved in improvements to real property. First, the landmark
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 14 effectively abolished the privity of
contract rule, an early common law rule that denied recovery to third-party
plaintiffs. Abolition of this rule meant that construction industry profession-
als and workers could be liable for their negligence to a variety of potential
plaintiffs. A related doctrine, the completed and accepted rule, also fell into
disrepute.' 5 Under the completed and accepted rule, an owner's acceptance
claimed that the statutes violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
supra note 8; Dworkin, supra note 7, at 54-61; McGovern, supra note 8, at 606-08.
12. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West 1961). The Wisconsin Supreme Court subse-
quently held the statute unconstitutional. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d
382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975); see infra text accompanying notes 125-131.
13. The District of Columbia and all states except Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, and Vermont
have enacted construction industry statutes of repose. ALA. CODE § 6-5-218 (1977); ALASKA
STAT. § 09.10.055 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-237 to -244 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 337.1 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 52-584a (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 12-310
(West Supp. 1978-1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-
1006 to -1011 (Harrison 1975 & Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1984);
IDAHO CODE § 5-241 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1966) (repealed);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-20-1 to -4 (Burns Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.135
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2772 (West 1965 & Supp. 1986); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (1964); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108
(1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 2B (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.5839 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West Supp. 1986);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.097 (Vernon Supp. 1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-222 to -223 (1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 11.202 to .206 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:14-1.1 (West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (1978); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW§ 214 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-01-44 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.31 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,§ 109 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.135 (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536
(Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-29 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-630 to -670 (Law.
Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-2A-1 to -5 (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 28-3-201 to -205 (1980); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.008 (Vernon 1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1977); VA. CODE § 8.01-250 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.300
(Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.89 (West 1983);
WYO. STAT. §§ 1-3-110 to -113 (1977 & Supp. 1986). Plaintiffs have challenged the constitu-
tionality of a number of these statutes. See supra note 8; infra notes 49 & 50; infra text accom-
panying notes 108-140. Statutes of repose create limitation periods ranging in duration from as
short as four years, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-237 to -244 (Supp. 1985) (personal injury and
wrongful death); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (West 1982) (patent defects only), to as long
as twelve years, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-630 to -670 (Law Co-op. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01-44 (1974), within which a plaintiff may commence an action.
14. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (1916). In MacPherson the court held that manu-
facturers owed a duty to consumers to exercise reasonable care in production. 111 N.E. at
1055. The court used foreseeability of harm rather than a contractual relationship between the
parties as the basis for imposing liability. Id. at 1054. Courts did not, however, fully deprive
architects and engineers of the privity of contract defense until the late 1950s. See Giles, Third
Party Liability: Context of the Courts, ARCHITECTURAL RECORD, Aug. 1975, at 50, 50; Com-
ment, supra note 9, at 361.
15. See, e.g., Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 708, 437 N.E.2d 514, 519-20 (1982) (stat-
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of a finished product terminated the liability of those involved in the con-
struction of the product. 16 Abolition of that rule extended the period of
potential liability indefinitely. Third, adoption of the discovery rule as the
criterion for triggering the running of a statute of limitation served to pro-
long potential liability. 17 Taken together these three legal developments
meant that architects, engineers, contractors, and others involved in con-
struction could be held liable indefinitely for property damage and personal
injury caused by their work. Statutes of repose provided a means of limiting
that liability to a legislatively defined period.
Statutes of repose designed to protect manufacturers and vendors from
extended product liability developed more recently, and fewer have been en-
acted than those designed to protect the construction industry.' 8 The pri-
mary rationale for the passage of product liability repose statutes has been
utes of repose are a response to abolition of completed and accepted doctrine); Totten v.
Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 207-08, 245 A.2d 1, 5 (1968) (rejecting the completed and accepted
doctrine in construction liability cases).
16. Comment, supra note 9, at 363.
17. The discovery rule defines a cause of action as accruing when the injured party discov-
ers or should have discovered the damage. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
18. Approximately one-third of the state legislatures have at one time adopted product
liability statutes of repose. Courts in five states have held the statutes unconstitutional; courts
in three states have upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. Statutes in the following states
are currently in effect, but the courts have not yet ruled on their constitutionality:
Arizona: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (Supp. 1979).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-402, -403(3) (Supp. 1985).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (Harrison Supp. 1986).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (Supp. 1985).
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) (establishes rebut-
table presumption against product defectiveness if injury occurs more than five years after sale
or eight years after manufacture).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (Supp. 1985).
Courts in the following states have upheld the constitutionality of product liability repose
statutes:
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213(4)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); statute upheld
against due process challenge in Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 727, 425
N.E.2d 522, 525 (1981).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Bums Supp. 1986); constitutionality of statute
affirmed in Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207, 213 (Ind. 1981).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (Supp. 1985); upheld in Hawkins v. D&J Press
Co., 527 F. Supp. 386, 388-90 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
Courts in the following states have held product liability repose statutes unconstitutional:
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (1975); held to violate the open courts and due process
provisions of the state constitution in Lankford v. Sullivan, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1980); held to deprive plaintiffs uncon-
stitutionally of access to the courts in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla.
1980).
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979); statute held unconstitu-
tional because it unreasonably deprived potential plaintiffs of a cause of action before the in-
jury in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 519, 464 A.2d 288, 295-96 (1983).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 99B (1979). A North Carolina court of appeals held
the statute, providing a six-year time bar running from date of sale, was unconstitutional, in
Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 595, 284 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1981). The
state supreme court affirmed and modified this decision without reaching the question of the
product liability repose statute's constitutionality. 306 N.C. 364, 372, 293 S.E.2d 415, 420
(1982). The following year, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the state's
construction industry statute of repose against constitutional attack. Lamb v. Wedgewood
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economic.' 9 In recent years the number of defective product suits and the
size of awards have increased dramatically; consequently, the costs of prod-
uct liability insurance and consumer goods have skyrocketed, resulting in a
negative economic climate for present and potential manufacturers. 20
Product liability repose statutes operate in the same manner as construc-
tion industry statutes of repose. Both types of statutes protect certain classes
of defendants from suit after a legislatively determined period of time. Each
type of statute is vulnerable to due process challenges on the same
grounds.2 1
B. Distinguishing Statutes of Limitation From Statutes of Repose
Strictly speaking, "statute of repose" is a generic term of which a statute
of limitation is but a variety. 22 The common characteristic shared by all
repose statutes, erection of a time barrier to legal action, allows prospective
defendants to rest free from concern that future legal liability may attach to
past actions. As commonly used, however, statute of repose denotes a dis-
tinct type of statute imposing a time bar different in purpose and implemen-
tation from a statute of limitation. Unless otherwise noted, this Comment
adopts the specific rather than generic usage of statute of repose.
Important differences between the types of time bars embodied in statutes
of limitation and statutes of repose are evident from a comparison of the
following excerpts from typical statutes:
Statute of Limitation
Actions for the recovery of compensation for damage or injury to per-
South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868, 879-82 (N.C. 1983). The constitutional status of North Caro-
lina's product liability repose statute is, therefore, uncertain at this time.
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13(b) (1978); ten-year product liability repose statute
held to violate right of access to courts in Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195,
199 (R.I. 1984).
See also McGovern, supra note 8, at 606-12 for a useful survey of statutes.
19. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-500 (1975) (intent of legislature; legislative findings) (legisla-
ture's analysis of social evils wrought by product liability suits); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-2
(1977) (legislative findings and declarations) (discussion of reasons for restricting liability in
product defect cases); Dworkin, supra note 7, at 33-34 (role of consumerism a key factor in
spread of repose statutes).
20. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 33-34; see Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A
New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977 INS. L.J. 535, 546. Some commentators, however,
dispute that product defect repose statutes will significantly reduce liability insurance premi-
ums. See MODEL UNIFORM PROD. LIAB. ACT § 101, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL UPLA] (model act, including analysis of and commentary on
product liability issues, developed by Commerce Department); Note, The Utah Product Liabil-
ity Limitation of Action: An Unfair Resolution of Competing Concerns, 1979 UTAH L. REV.
149, 151 (limiting products liability suits will have limited impact on insurance rates).
21. Jackson v. Mannesman Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725, 727-28 (Ala. 1983); see infra
part II.
22. As the United States Supreme Court said in Wood v. Carpenter, "[s]tatutes of limita-
tion ... promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs." 101 U.S. 135, 139
(1879); see Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1964); Developments in the
Law, supra note 5, at 1185; see also McGovern, supra note 8, at 582-85 (describing several
different definitions of statute of repose and the inconsistent use of these definitions by courts
and commentators).
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sons or property shall be instituted within two years after the cause of
action accrued, and not after .... 23
Construction Industry Statute of Repose
No action to recover damages, whether based upon contract or sound-
ing in tort, resulting from or arising out of any deficiency in the design,
planning, supervision, inspection or construction of any improvement
to real property, or for any injury to property, either real or personal,
arising out of such deficiency, or for injury to the person or for wrongful
death arising out of such deficiency shall be brought against any person
performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, inspection
or construction of any such improvement after the expiration of five (5)
years following the substantial completion of such improvement.2 4
Product Liability Statute of Repose
[A]ny product liability action.., shall be commenced within ten years
after the date when the product which allegedly caused the personal
injury, death, or damage was first sold or leased for use or
consumption.25
Suppose that in a state with statutes such as those presented above, the
following scenario occurs. In 1974 Ace Breweries contracts with Big Beer
Construction Services to build a new brewery. Big Beer builds the plant,
subcontracts for various equipment, and hires Radiography Service to X-ray
all welds in the brewing machinery. Radiography and Big Beer certify to
Ace that the new plant meets all safety specifications. The brewery is sub-
stantially completed on December 31, 1979. On January 1, 1985, the brew-
ing machinery explodes, killing several employees and demolishing the
plant. Subsequent examination by engineers reveals that a faulty weld in the
machinery, which gave way under heat and high pressure, caused the explo-
sion. Their examination also shows that a pressure gauge, manufactured by
Grand Gauges and sold to Big Beer in 1974, was defective and thus failed to
provide warning of the impending explosion. On January 1, 1986, Ace files
suit against Big Beer, Radiography, and Gauge. On the same day the dece-
dents' beneficiaries also file wrongful death actions against Big Beer, Radiog-
raphy, and Gauge, as well as against Ace.
The statute of limitation excerpted above allows two years from the time a
cause of action accrues within which to commence a suit. In the proffered
hypothetical the plaintiffs are well within the statutory period, having
brought suit one year after the accident. Under both statutes of repose, how-
ever, the suits against Big Beer, Radiography, and Gauge are time-barred.
Only nonprotected defendants such as materialmen and the owner/tenant,
Ace Breweries, are subject to suit. 26 Thus, statutes of repose differ from
23. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-7 (1976).
24. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981).
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
26. Construction industry statutes of repose generally do not protect owners, tenants, or
materialmen. Note, Actions Arising out of Improvements to Real Property. Special Statutes of
Limitations, 57 N.D.L. REV. 43, 50-53 (1981); see supra note 11.
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statutes of limitation in crucial respects.
The most important difference between statutes of limitation and statutes
of repose is the mechanism that triggers the commencement of their limita-
tions periods. Statutes of limitation begin to run when a cause of action
accrues. 27 Unless tolled,28 a statute of limitation runs from the date of ac-
crual until the end of the designated period within which a plaintiff may
bring the action.
Statutes of repose, on the other hand, run for a statutorily determined
period of time calculated independently of an injurious occurrence or discov-
ery of damage or injury.29 The date that triggers the running of a statute of
repose depends on the jurisdiction and the type of statute. Statutes of repose
designed to protect those in the construction industry generally run from the
date of substantial completion of the improvement to real property;30 prod-
uct liability repose statutes usually run from the date of sale or lease of the
product. 31 Once a statute of repose has run, it operates to prevent a legally
cognizable cause of action from arising.32 Thus, the time within which a suit
may be brought is unrelated to the point when injury or discovery of injury
27. See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
28. Tolling of a statute means that its application is temporarily suspended. The most
common circumstance under which both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are
tolled is fraudulent concealment of a defect, wherein potential defendants conceal evidence
necessary for plaintiffs to file suit. The United States Supreme Court first recognized fraudu-
lent concealment of a defect as a basis for tolling a statute of limitations in the case of Bailey v.
Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874). In recent years plaintiffs have asserted this
claim in a rapidly increasing number of cases. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal
Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829, 833 & n.31, 915 (1983). A
defendant's absence from the jurisdiction was once a rationale used by courts for tolling limita-
tions periods. State long-arm statutes that allow courts to assert personal jurisdiction over
absent defendants have reduced the legitimacy of this tolling claim. See Dworkin, supra note
7, at 50. For example, the Texas Supreme Court recently refused to hold that the state's
medical malpractice statute of limitations, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01
(Vernon Supp. 1985), was tolled while the defendant physician was out of state. Hill v. Milani,
686 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex. 1985). For a general discussion of tolling doctrines, see Dworkin,
supra note 7, at 48-53.
29. See, e.g., Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 195, 291 So. 2d 306,
309-10 (1974): Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 495-96, 491 P.2d 203, 204 (1971).
30. Many statutes of repose define substantial completion. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 337.15(g) (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1011
(1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.310
(Supp. 1986). A common theme in these definitions is the availability of the improvement for
its intended use. Some statutes define availability in such a way as to favor prospective defend-
ants by selecting the earliest possible date of use; other statutes define substantial completion in
a manner more favorable to plaintiffs. See Knapp, Application of Special Statutes of Limitations
Concerning Design and Construction, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 360 (1979). For example, the
District of Columbia statute of repose begins to run from the earlier of the date on which an
improvement is first used or the date on which it is first available for use. D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 12.3 10(a)(2) (West Supp. 1978-1979). The New Mexico statute, on the other hand, begins to
run on the latest of three alternative dates: sufficient completion to allow the intended use,
actual use, or the date on which the contractor indicates the improvement is substantially
complete. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (1978).
31. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-224 (Cum. Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(b) (1983).
32. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972);
Loyal Order of Moose v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143, 146 (Okla. 1977); Kornblut, supra note 7, at




Statutes of repose never serve to extend applicable statutes of limitation.
34
Nor do otherwise applicable statutes of limitation override a repose statute's
time limit for bringing a cause of action.35 For purposes of illustration, con-
sider the above excerpted statutes of limitation and repose and their applica-
tion to the hypothetical accident. Suppose that the brewery accident occurs
one year after substantial completion of the brewery. The plaintiffs then
have only the two years specified by the statute of limitation within which to
commence an action; the five- and ten-year statute of repose periods are ir-
relevant to the suits specified in the hypothetical. Thus, if a cause of action
accrues well before a statute of repose has run, the plaintiff's diligence in
bringing suit before the statute of limitation time-bars the action is of crucial
importance.
The time sequence in the original hypothetical exemplifies the other ex-
treme. Because the repose statute had expired before the accident occurred,
the plaintiffs have no remedy against most of the defendants even though the
statute of limitation period would ordinarily have commenced at the time of
the accident. Thus, when an injury occurs after a statute of repose time-bars
an action, the alacrity of the plaintiff's attorney in filing suit is inconsequen-
tial. The injury simply does not give rise to a legally recognized cause of
action. 36
A third type of situation occurs when a cause of action accrues shortly
before a statute of repose runs. Under such circumstances the statute of
repose operates in effect as a statute of limitation. For example, if the hypo-
thetical accident occurs four years after the five-year statute of repose begins
to run, plaintiffs have only one year within which to commence their actions,
rather than the two years allowed by the regular statute of limitation. If the
accident occurs four years and nine months after substantial completion,
plaintiffs have only three months left to bring suit. If the explosion occurs
33. The California and Florida construction industry statutes of repose have special provi-
sions relating to latent defects that mitigate the harshness of the repose bars to litigation. CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982). The
California statute allows only four years within which to bring actions arising from patent
defects but allows ten years if a latent defect caused the damage. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 337.15 (West 1982). The Florida statute extends the repose period of four years for patent
defects to fifteen years for latent deficiencies in design and construction. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982).
34. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 122, 335 A.2d 545, 553 (1975); Terry v.
New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 122-23, 645 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (1982); Watts
v. Putnam County, 525 S.W.2d 488, 492-94 (Tenn. 1975).
35. In O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d 545 (1975), for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court refused to allow a plaintiff to recover for an injury sustained nine years after
substantial completion of an apartment building even though the state's applicable repose stat-
ute had a ten-year bar because the plaintiff did not file suit until the eleventh year after sub-
stantial completion. Although the statute of limitation for personal injury did not bar the
cause of action, the court held that the repose statute did. 67 N.J. at 122, 335 A.2d at 553-54;
see also Watts v. Putnam County, 525 S.W.2d 488, 491-93 (Tenn. 1975) (construction industry
statute of repose construed as placing a "ceiling" on otherwise applicable statute of limitations
periods).
36. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972);
infra notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text.
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four years and 364 days after substantial completion triggers the statute of
repose, the operative limitations period within which plaintiffs could com-
mence an action would be one day. In other words, when an otherwise ap-
plicable statute of limitation period exceeds the time that remains to run on a
statute of repose, the statute of limitation becomes irrelevant, and the stat-
ute of repose takes over as the operative limitation statute.3 7
Most statute of repose cases alleging a due process violation involve the
fact pattern described in the second situation: the injury occurs after the
statute of repose has expired.3 8 Due process challenges involving such cir-
cumstances have met with mixed results. 39 The final situation described
above, however, illustrates the context in which repose statutes become most
vulnerable to a due process challenge. That is, when an accident occurs
shortly before the expiration of the applicable statute of repose, strict appli-
cation of the time bar cuts off the period that a plaintiff would normally have
to bring suit under a statute of limitation. Few courts have considered the
question of due process violations in this latter situation. Those courts that
have addressed the issue, however, have found serious constitutional
problems in allowing a statute of repose to abolish an extant cause of
action.4o
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Due Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose
The most common due process challenge to repose statutes asserts that
extinction of a remedy before an injury arises constitutes denial of access to
the courts for redress of a wrong.41 Whether framed as a violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 42 or a state constitution
open court provision,43 the arguments and issues are virtually identical. 44
37. See O'Brien v. Hazelet & Edral, 410 Mich. 1, 9, 299 N.W.2d 336, 341 (1980); Watts v.
Putnam County, 525 S.W.2d 488, 491-93 (Tenn. 1975); Dworkin, supra note 7, at 63.
38. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 740 F.2d 1362, 1367 (6th Cir. 1984);
Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983);
Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 826-27 (Colo. 1982); Klein v. Catalano, 386
Mass. 701, 709-10, 712-13, 437 N.E.2d 514, 521, 523-24 (1982); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Edral,
410 Mich. 1, 9-10, 299 N.W.2d 336, 341-43 (1980); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104,
106-07, 551 P.2d 647, 652 (1976); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293
A.2d 662, 667 (1972); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d
715, 721 (1978).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 45-64.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 108-140.
41. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 64; see, e.g., Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d
572, 573-75 (Fla. 1979); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 106-07, 551 P.2d 647, 652
(1976); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, art. 1, § 17.
43. E.g., "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; see, e.g., ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 13; Ky. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 14; Mo. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS art. I,
§ 14; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10.
44. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. Lawrence, 740 F.2d 1362, 1367 (6th Cir. 1984); Klein
v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 707 n.6, 437 N.E.2d 514, 519 n.6 (1982); Dworkin, supra note 7, at
53. Some state courts have held, however, that their open courts provisions provide even
greater protection to injured plaintiffs than the federal due process clause. E.g., Overland
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The major problem with due process challenges that arise when a repose
statute time-bars a cause of action before it accrues is that neither the federal
nor state constitutions absolutely guarantee the right to seek a remedy for a
wrong.4 5 Due process only protects vested rights.4 6 If a statute of repose
has run, no legally recognized cause of action can accrue and, therefore, no
right can vest. If no legally cognizable injury exists, no denial of a remedy
can occur.
47
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the authority of legislatures
to abolish remedies as long as the legislature does not abrogate a vested right
without providing alternative relief to the plaintiff.48 Plaintiffs whose rights
have not vested before the statutory time bar have thus met with only lim-
ited success in challenging the constitutionality of repose statutes. Courts are
generally unsympathetic to the suggestion that legislatures may not bar a
future cause of action. 49 The high courts of a few states have held, however,
Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 573-75 (Fla. 1979); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218,
224-25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). For a discussion of the relationship between due process and
access to the courts in a different context see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-83
(1971). In Boddie the United States Supreme Court held that a state could not, through the
imposition of mandatory court fees, deny access to its courts to indigents seeking divorces
because due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard when the state controls the
only legal avenue for relief. Id. at 378-79, 383.
45. See Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist., 366 So. 2d 1381, 1388 (La. 1978); Rosen-
berg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972); Freezer Storage,
Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978).
46. Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003
(1983); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Edral, 410 Mich. 1, 9, 299 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Mich. 1980); Rosen-
berg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972); Watts v. Putnam
County, 525 S.W.2d 488, 492 (Tenn. 1975).
47. See Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist., 366 So. 2d 1381, 1388 (La. 1978); Rosen-
berg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972); Freezer Storage,
Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978). One commentator sug-
gests that this reasoning may not survive the courts' consideration of product liability suits
involving delayed manifestation injuries such as asbestosis. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 40-41,
45-48. But see Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1003 (1983) (sustaining Indiana Product Liability Act's ten-year statute of repose, IND. CODE
§ 33-1-1.5-5 (1981), in an asbestosis wrongful death action).
48. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87, 88
n.32 (1978); Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329
(1921); Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 561 (1920); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34,
40-41 (1906).
49. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 740 F.2d 1362, 1373 (6th Cir. 1984)
(sustaining Ohio's construction industry statute of repose over due process and equal protec-
tion challenges); Pitts v. Unarco Indus. Inc., 712 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1003 (1983) (sustaining Indiana Product Liability Act's ten-year statute of repose on due
process and equal protection grounds); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 826-27
(Colo. 1982) (en banc) (upholding ten-year construction repose statute over due process and
equal protection challenges); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 709-10, 712-15, 437 N.E.2d
514, 521, 523-24 (1982) (in barring accrual of cause of action that arose eight years after
substantial completion, state's six-year construction industry repose statute did not violate due
process or equal protection); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Edral, 410 Mich. 1, 9-10, 299 N.W.2d 336,
341-43 (1980) (sustaining construction industry statute of repose in case involving injuries sus-
tained eight years after statute had run); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 106-07, 551
P.2d 647, 652 (1976) (sustaining construction industry repose statute but requiring that alter-
nate remedies be available to plaintiffs in order to avoid due process problems); Rosenberg v.
Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 A.2d 662, 667-68 (1972) (holding that statute of
repose did not violate plaintiff's due process rights by preventing suit on an injury sustained
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that bars to actions for injuries that have not yet occurred violate state con-
stitutional requirements of free access to the courts. 5° Nevertheless, it is un-
likely that the United States Supreme Court would find a due process
violation from the mere fact that statutes of repose set an outside time limit
on when a legally cognizable injury may arise.5 1 The Supreme Court has
thrice refused to review lower court decisions upholding state statutes of
repose in the face of due process challenges. All three cases involved rights
unaccrued at the time the statute of repose barred the action. In Carter v.
Hartenstein52 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the section of the state's
construction industry statute of repose dealing with personal injury and
wrongful death. 53 The case involved the wrongful death of a boy in an eleva-
tor accident ten years after substantial completion of the improvement. The
plaintiff challenged the state's four-year repose statute on federal due process
and equal protection grounds as well as on state constitutional grounds. The
Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed all of the challenges, concluding that the
statute was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. 54 The Texas case of
thirty-three years after highway substantially completed); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978) (upholding construction industry statute of
repose against open courts challenge; legislature may abolish common law causes of action);
Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2d 543, 548 (R.I. 1985) (upholding construction industry statute of
repose against access to court challenge on grounds that statute does not deprive plaintiff of all
remedies).
50. The following state courts have held that statutes of repose unconstitutionally deprive
plaintiffs of due process either under the federal constitution or under state access to the courts
provisions:
Alabama: Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725, 729 (Ala. 1983) (con-
struction industry statute); Lankford v. Sullivan, 416 So. 2d 996, 1003-04 (Ala. 1982) (product
liability statute).
Florida: Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874, 874 (Fla. 1980) (product
liability statute); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 573-75 (Fla. 1979) (con-
struction statute).
Kentucky: Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 224-25 (Ky. 1973). In Carney v. Moody, 646
S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. 1982), however, the Kentucky Supreme Court limited the holding in
Saylor to causes of action recognized in Kentucky at the time the state adopted its constitution.
The Kentucky state constitution prohibits the abolition of legal remedies for wrongful death,
personal injury, and property damage, among other torts. Ky. CONST. §§ 14, 54. According
to the Kentucky Supreme Court, however, this prohibition applies only to causes of action in
existence at the time the state adopted its constitution in 1891. Carney, 646 S.W.2d at 41.
Hence, statutes of repose are unconstitutional under Kentucky law only in those situations
when application of the statute would deprive an injured party of a remedy extant in 1891. Id.
New Hampshire: Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288, 295 (1983)
(product liability statute).
Rhode Island: Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 199 (R.I. 1984) (product
liability statute). But see Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2d 543, 547-48 (R.I. 1985) (sustaining con-
struction industry repose statute).
Wyoming: Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 831 (Wyo. 1980) (construction
statute).
51. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87
(1978); Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921);
Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 561 (1920); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 40-41
(1906).
52. 248 Ark. 172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971).




Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator 55 also involved a wrongful death action resulting
from an elevator accident. The elevator had been installed forty-nine years
before the plaintiff's decedent fell to his death.56 The Texas court of civil
appeals held that the state's ten-year construction industry repose statute57
did not violate equal protection or due process rights and that the statute
barred recovery by the plaintiff.58 Most recently, the Supreme Court refused
to review a case, Pitts v. Unarco Industries, Inc.,59 in which the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld the Indiana Product Liability Act's 6° repose statute.6' The
plaintiff's husband died two years after Indiana passed its products liability
repose statute that barred actions accruing more than ten years after the
initial delivery of the product. The plaintiff's husband was exposed to asbes-
tos for many years as part of his employment. The court held that the plain-
tiff's cause of action did not vest until her husband died 62 and that, in the
absence of proof that the defendants had furnished asbestos products to the
decedent within the ten years preceding his death, the plaintiff could not
recover. 63 According to the Seventh Circuit, the statute did not deprive the
plaintiff of due process because it did not bar an existing cause of action; the
death of the decedent, the event giving rise to the cause of action, occurred
more than ten years after the delivery of the damaging products.64
The situation posing a more serious challenge to statutes of repose in-
volves the operation of the statutes in extinguishing an already accrued right.
Once a legally cognizable cause of action accrues, the plaintiff has a vested
right in that action.65 The due process clause protects vested interests
against unreasonable interference. 66 This constitutional protection is not,
however, unconditional or indefinite. Statutes of limitation, for example, ex-
tinguish vested rights if a plaintiff fails to pursue a remedy with due dili-
gence. Neither statutes of limitation nor other types of time bars, however,
may extinguish vested rights without allowing the plaintiff reasonable oppor-
tunity to commence an action. 67 The situation in which a statute of repose
operates as an abnormally abbreviated limitation period is thus the situation
55. 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 802 (1982).
56. 618 S.W.2d at 871-72.
57. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon Supp. 1981) (recodified as TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.008 (1986)).
58. 618 S.W.2d at 873.
59. 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
60. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1.5-1 to .5-8 (Burns 1982).
61. 712 F.2d at 279.
62. Id.
63. Id. at,277-78./
64. Id. at 279.
65. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933); Barr v. Preskitt, 389 F. Supp. 496,
498 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Lankford v. Sullivan, 416 So. 2d 996, 1005 (Ala. 1982).
66. In Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933), the Court held that the due
process clause does not guarantee a particular remedy but that it does require the government
to provide the plaintiff with some effective means of obtaining redress. See Barr v. Preskitt,
389 F. Supp. 496, 498 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Lankford v. Sullivan, 416 So. 2d 996, 1005 (Ala.
1982).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 87-97.
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in which repose statutes become most vulnerable to due process challenge.68
In that context the repose statute overrides the statute of limitation and vio-
lates the policies underpinning limitations legislation. Examination of the
rationale for statutory time bars and the tests that they must meet in order to
pass constitutional scrutiny aids exploration of the efficacy of the due process
challenges in that situation.
B. Policies Underlying Limitations on Action
Two competing policy considerations underlie statutory time bars. The
first consideration is fairness to defendants. 69 Limitation periods serve to
protect potential defendants from indefinite liability.70 The United States
Supreme Court, in Burnett v. New York Central Railroad,71 explained that
statutes of limitation promote justice by preventing the assertion of claims
that slumbered while evidence, memories, and witnesses were lost.72 The
Court also pointed out that statutes of limitation promote fairness to defend-
ants by requiring adequate notice,73 for within a set period of time plaintiffs
must notify defendants of damage and a pending lawsuit.
The second policy consideration related to statutory time bars embodies
the requirement of justice for plaintiffs. Although defendants should not
have to litigate stale claims, plaintiffs must have adequate opportunity to
seek redress in the courts for wrongs against them. 74 In Burnett, although
the Court considered fairness to the defendant and the courts as the basic
purpose of statutes of limitation, it stressed that such considerations of fair-
ness must be balanced against the rights of plaintiffs who have not slept on
their rights, but have been unable to assert them.75 In such cases the impor-
tance of preserving the plaintiffs' rights outweighs concern for the protection
of defendants. 76
Statutes of limitation thus represent a legislative compromise between the
68. See supra text following note 39; infra text accompanying notes 108-140.
69. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1965); Kornblut, supra
note 7, at 49.
70. Adjudication of stale claims would be both unfair to defendants and unduly burden-
some on the courts. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980); Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
71. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
72. Id. at 428 (quoting from Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)); see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980)
(limitation periods operate to prevent unfairness to defendants).
73. 380 U.S. at 428.
74. See, e.g., Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933) (fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees only substantial right to redress); Barr v. Preskitt, 389 F. Supp. 496, 498 (M.D. Ala. 1975)
(state has exclusive control over remedy short of destroying vested rights); Lankford v. Sulli-
van, 416 So. 2d 996, 1005 (Ala. 1982) (legislature must provide reasonable method to enforce
rights).
75. 380 U.S. at 428-29. Burnett involved the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA)
three-year statute of limitation. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982). The plaintiff's FELA action was dis-
missed in Ohio court for improper venue. By the time the plaintiff brought a federal action,
the FELA limitation period had run. The Supreme Court, however, refused to bar the action,
holding that to time bar an otherwise properly filed FELA action merely because venue was
improper would be unfair. 380 U.S. at 430, 434.
76. 380 U.S. at 428.
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competing rights and interests of plaintiffs and defendants. Such statutes
provide a prescribed time period within which a plaintiff may seek redress in
the courts. At the same time the statutes establish a deadline after which a
defendant is free from potential claims.
Statutes of repose, like statutes of limitation, serve to protect potential
defendants. Repose statutes prevent parties from being called upon to de-
fend a negligence allegation when the passage of years suggests that the
harm is more likely the result of owner or operator neglect than of any de-
sign or construction defect. 77 Statutes of repose, however, contain an inher-
ent flaw: in some circumstances repose statutes cannot operate without
abrogating the policies underpinning limitation statutes. When the harm oc-
curs or is discovered immediately prior to the running of the repose statute,
the statute of repose operates as a very abbreviated statute of limitation that
prevents the prosecution of a fresh, rather than a stale, cause of action. A
vested claim is extinguished not by procrastination on the part of the plain-
tiff, but by an arbitrary time bar. Similarly, the fair notice rationale for time
bars78 is irrelevant when an injury of which the tortfeasor is aware occurs
just prior to the running of a statute of repose. Unless the injured party can
bring suit immediately, the tortfeasor is immune even though he had actual
notice of the damage and of his potential culpability. 79
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that fourteenth
amendment due process requires that statutes of limitation must provide the
plaintiff with a reasonable opportunity to bring an action.80 The Court has
not yet considered the question of whether statutes of repose violate this
reasonableness requirement when they are strictly construed as cutting short
an otherwise applicable limitations period. Lower courts considering this
question, however, have found due process violated by unreasonably brief
periods for filing suit.81 The following section examines the reasonableness
requirement the Court imposes on statutory limitation periods.
C. The Reasonableness Requirement
Statutes of limitation have been a part of the common law since at least
77. Kornblut, supra note 7, at 49. The author also reports a study indicating that con-
struction industry statutes of repose generally do not work a hardship on potential plaintiffs
because the vast majority of claims against architects and engineers are filed within seven years
of project completion. Id. at 50. Some states, however, have adopted statutes with time bars
considerably shorter than seven years. See supra note 13. Similarly, few product defect acci-
dents occur after six years from the date of purchase or ten years from the date of manufac-
ture. MODEL UPLA, analysis of § 101, supra note 20, at 62,733; see Massery, supra note 20, at
542.
78. See supra text accompanying note 73.
79. Statutes of limitation may also place harsh burdens on plaintiffs by failing to distin-
guish between avoidable and justifiable delays in commencing actions. Chase Securities Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125
(1979). Many states have adopted the discovery rule in an effort to mitigate some of the unjust
effects of limitation periods. See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 108-136 and accompanying text.
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1540.82 The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
such statutes in a number of early decisions83 and has reaffirmed the import
and validity of limitation statutes in recent decisions. 84 Legislatures may
constitutionally restrict remedies by providing a deadline for a plaintiff to
seek redress in the courts. 85 Legislatures may even give retroactive effect to a
reduction in the limitation period, thereby reducing the amount of time
available to plaintiffs for commencing actions.86 The authority of the legisla-
ture to modify rights that have already accrued, however, is subject to the
constitutional requirement that plaintiffs have sufficient time within which to
commence a suit. In the seminal case of Wilson v. Iseminger 87 the Court set
forth the requirement that legislatures assure plaintiffs whose rights have
accrued access to the courts.8 8 According to the Court, this requirement is
an absolute precondition to the constitutionality of any statute of
limitation. 89
The Court has frequently reaffirmed the constitutional necessity of provid-
ing plaintiffs with access to the courts.90 In doing so, the Court has stipu-
lated that an essential feature of access is a reasonable time to bring one's
case to court.91 In Canadian Northern Railway v. Eggen 92 the Court consid-
82. The Act of Limitation with a Proviso, 32 Hen. 8, c.2 (1540). See generally H. WOOD,
A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY (3d ed. 1901).
83. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33
(1877); Sohn v. Waterson, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 596, 599-600 (1873); Stearns v. Page, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 819, 828 (1849); Hawkins v. Barney, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 466 (1831).
84. E.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980); United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979).
85. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628,
632-33 (1877).
86. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978)(legislature may abolish a right of action before it accrues or modify an existing one if it pro-
vides a reasonable alternative for protecting the right); see also Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69,
74 (1877) (change in statute of limitation period does not impair contract so long as reasonable
time allowed parties for commencement of suit).
87. 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
88. Id. at 62-64.
89. The Court stated:
It may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation must proceed on the
idea that the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the
courts. A statute could not bar the existing rights of claimants without afford-
ing this opportunity; if it should do so, it would not be a statute of limitations,
but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the
purport of its provisions.
Id. at 62-63.
90. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (in equal protection challenge to
paternity suit filing period for illegitimate children court held two-year statute of limitation
period unconstitutional because unreasonably short; see infra text accompanying notes 100-
104); Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 429, 430, 434 (1965) (extending the
FELA three-year statutory limitations period, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982), in the interest of justice
to the plaintiff); Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 562 (1920) (reaffirming the require-
ment of a reasonable time period for filing suit).
91. For example, in Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877), the Court said: "This court
has often decided that statutes of limitation affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional, if
a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect." Id.
at 632 (citing Sohn v. Waterson, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 596 (1873); Hawkins v. Barney, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 457 (1831)). For more recent statements see Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S.
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ered the question of an appropriate test for sufficiency of time within which
to file a complaint. Canadian Northern involved a privileges and immunities
clause93 challenge to a Minnesota statute of limitations that applied only to
nonresidents. 94 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota
statute and found the one-year statute of limitations that Minnesota had ap-
plied to the plaintiff to be fair.95 According to the Court, the test of the
fairness of a limitations statute is not whether the statute applies equally to
all categories of persons, but whether it reasonably and adequately allows a
plaintiff to enforce his rights.96 This "reasonable and adequate" requirement
is met when a person has free access to courts for a length of time sufficient
for an ordinarily diligent person to commence legal proceedings to protect
his rights. 97
D. Judicial Review of the Sufficiency of Limitation Periods
Courts generally pay great deference to legislative determinations of what
constitutes a reasonable time period within which plaintiffs may commence
an action.98 In Iseminger9 9 the United States Supreme Court indicated that
it would defer to the wisdom of the legislature as to the appropriateness of a
time bar unless the time limit was so short that it constituted a denial of
justice. 100 In later cases, however, the Court suggested that a less deferential
approach by the judiciary might be in order. In Canadian Northern, for
example, the Court affirmed that the courts have the ultimate power to de-
termine the reasonableness and adequacy of the terms on which legislatures
grant a plaintiff access to the courts.101
The Supreme Court has further affirmed its commitment to review the
reasonableness of statutes of limitation in cases not involving due process
challenges to the statutes. In two recent cases the Court has invalidated
statutes of limitation on equal protection grounds.102 In each case the state
legislature had subjected child support suits involving illegitimate children
233, 246 (1944); Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Helix Irrigation Dist., 514 F.2d
465, 468 (9th Cir. 1975); Lankford v. Sullivan, 416 So. 2d 996, 1005 (Ala. 1982).
92. 252 U.S. 553 (1920).
93. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
94. MINN. STAT. § 7709 (1913). The statute provided that nonresidents could bring ac-
tions in Minnesota courts only during the period of time allowed by the statute of limitation
applicable in the state in which the cause of action arose.
95. 252 U.S. at 561-63.
96. Id. at 562.
97. Id.
98. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 8, § 4 (11th ed. 1985) (re-
viewing levels of scrutiny applied by the courts in considering whether legislation violates due
process).
99. 185 U.S. at 60-61.
100. Id. at 63.
101. 252 U.S. at 562.
102. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982). In
Pickett the Court did not discuss Pickett's due process challenge to the statute because princi-
ples discussed in Mills required the Court to invalidate the limitations period in question on
equal protection grounds. Pickett, 462 U.S. at 11.
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to certain limitation periods while exempting suits involving legitimate chil-
dren from similar limitation periods. The import of these decisions for due
process challenges to repose statutes lies in the strong language the Court
used in condemning the unreasonableness of the statutes of limitation.'0 3
The Court held that although legislatures have a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting defendants from stale claims, such an interest does not justify the
imposition of unrealistically short time bars. ,o4
The United States Supreme Court has not yet reviewed the constitutional-
ity of statutes of repose. The Court's holdings with respect to unreasonable
statute of limitation periods, 10 5 however, should apply with equal force to
unreasonable repose periods. Legislatures, whether through statutes of limi-
tation or repose, ought not to deprive plaintiffs of a reasonable opportunity
to assert their claims.
E. Lower Court Reactions to Due Process Challenges
State courts most frequently face due process challenges to repose statutes
in the context of injuries sustained after the expiration of the repose time
bar. 10 6 Although most state courts have refused to hold their states' statutes
of repose violative of due process merely because they bar future causes of
action from accruing, a few have held repose statutes unconstitutional on the
basis of either due process or analogous open courts provisions of their state
constitutions. 0 7 Even greater unanimity of opinion exists among courts as
to the unconstitutionality of applying repose statute deadlines to injuries that
occur a short time before the statute runs.
The most direct confrontation between a statute of repose and the consti-
tutional requirement of a reasonable time within which to bring an action
came in Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Commission. 10 8 Terry involved
a wrongful death action resulting from a one-car accident on a public high-
way. The accident and death occurred nine years and nine months after the
highway had been substantially completed. New Mexico's construction in-
dustry repose statute barred actions against architects, engineers, and con-
tractors after ten years from the date of a project's substantial completion. 0 9
After the statute of repose had run, but before the applicable statute of limi-
tation barred the action, the plaintiffs commenced a wrongful death suit
against the highway contractor, engineer, and others. The defendants con-
tended that the state repose statute shielded them from liability in that it
103. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 13 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102-04
(1982) (concurring opinion by O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Blackmun,
and Powell, JJ.); see also G. GUNTHER, supra note 98, at 682-83 (analyzing the import of the
Mills and Pickett opinions).
104. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983); Brown v. Mills, 456 U.S. 91, 100-01
(1982).
105. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 49-50.
108. 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982).
109. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (1978).
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specifically prohibited an action for damages after the ten-year time bar. 0
The plaintiffs argued that the repose statute was unconstitutional on due
process and equal protection grounds. The New Mexico Supreme Court re-
jected the equal protection argument.II1 The court also rejected the conten-
tion that statutes of repose violate due process when they bar future causes
of action.11 2 The court did find, however, that application of the statute to
an existing cause of action was an unconstitutional deprivation of the plain-
tiffs' right to due process of law. 1 3 The court emphasized that the statute of
repose operated as a statute of limitation in limiting the plaintiffs to an un-
reasonably short three-month period within which to commence an
action. "14
The New Mexico Supreme Court's opinion in Terry squarely addressed
the issue raised, but not answered, by the Michigan Supreme Court in
O'Brien v. Hazelet & Edral. 115 O'Brien also involved suits against highway
architects and engineers for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
The O'Brien accident, however, occurred fourteen years after substantial
completion of the road. Michigan's repose statute contained a six-year time
bar. 1 6 The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute," 17 but implied that it might reach a different result if confronted
with an injury sustained shortly before the expiration of the statutory
period. 118
The Alabama Supreme Court held two different types of repose statutes
facially invalid for failure to provide reasonable access to the courts. Lank-
ford v. Sullivan 119 involved a challenge to Alabama's product liability stat-
ute of repose, which barred suits ten years after a product was first put into
use.' 20 The court reviewed the constitutionality of statutory time bars and
found Alabama's product liability statute wanting, partly because it lacked a
savings clause to suspend the operation of the time bar against suits arising
out of injuries occurring near the end of the ten-year period. 12 1 The follow-
110. 98 N.M. at 120-21, 645 P.2d at 1376-77.




115. 410 Mich. 1, 15 n.18, 299 N.W.2d 336, 341 n.18 (1980).
116. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5839(1) (West 1968).
117. 410 Mich. at 19-20, 299 N.W.2d at 341-43.
118. Id. at 15 n.18, 299 N.W.2d at 341 n.18 ("[t]o a plaintiff whose injury occurred and
whose right of action thus vested shortly before expiration of the six-year period, the statute
arguably might deny due process by failing to 'afford a reasonable time within which suit may
be brought.'" (quoting Pnee v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318, 324 (1865)).
119. 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
120. ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (1975).
121. 416 So. 2d at 1003-04 (Tolbert, C.J. concurring specially). In a lengthy and strongly
worded concurring opinion, the chief justice said:
Without a savings clause to provide for those injuries occurring near the expira-
tion of the ten-year period, this ten-year period of repose is a violation of due
process .... Due process requires that statutes of limitation allow an individual
a reasonable time in which to bring suit. Likewise, a statute of repose that does
not embody a flexible outer limit to allow a reasonable time for suit when an
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ing year, in Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp.,122 the court relied heav-
ily on its Lankford reasoning to find Alabama's construction industry repose
statute unconstitutional.1 23 The court held that the legislature's failure to
provide for plaintiffs whose cause of action vests shortly before the statute
runs made the statute arbitrary and, therefore, facially invalid.124
The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to allow that state's statute of re-
pose to extinguish a plaintiff's vested property right in an accrued cause of
action in Hunter v. School District. 125 Hunter involved injuries arising out of
the collapse of a gymnasium wall. Contractors completed the construction
of the gymnasium in 1960, the injury occurred in 1975, and the plaintiff filed
suit in 1977. Several months prior to the accident the Wisconsin Supreme
Court invalidated the state construction industry statute of repose on equal
protection grounds. 126 Consequently, no statute of repose was in effect at
the time of plaintiff's injury. Thus, the state's regular three-year statute of
limitation for personal injury governed the plaintiff's cause of action. 127 The
state legislature, however, amended the repose statute to conform with equal
protection requirements and reenacted the statute, effective in 1976.128 The
new statute contained a six-year time bar to liability of construction industry
personnel and was in effect at the time the plaintiff filed suit in 1977. The
issue faced by the court was whether the new statute barred the plaintiff's
cause of action since the injury occurred fifteen years after construction.
The court held that even if it were to apply the new statute retroactively, the
statute could not bar the plaintiff's cause of action.' 29 The plaintiff had a
constitutionally protected vested property right in her cause of action; to
divest her of such a right would violate the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.' 30 Because the court found the statute inapplicable to a
vested right, it did not reach the question of whether the statute of repose
was constitutional in other respects.' 3 '
In Calder v. City of Crystal 132 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a
newly reenacted construction industry repose statute.' 33 Several years ear-
injury occurs near the end of the statutory period also denies constitutionally
required due process.
Id. at 1005-06.
122. 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983).
123. Id. at 728-29 (holding ALA. CODE § 6-5-218 (1977) unconstitutional).
124. 435 So. 2d at 729.
125. 97 Wis. 2d 435, 293 N.W.2d 515 (1980).
126. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 393, 225 N.W.2d 454, 460
(1975) (declaring Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West 1961) unconstitutional on the ground that
the statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by protecting
only certain categories of construction industry personnel).
127. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.205 (West 1961).
128. Id. § 893.155 (West 1976). The new statute also provided a six-month grace period
for injuries occurring or discovered during the fifth year. For a discussion of the import of
grace periods see infra text accompanying notes 148-151.
129. 97 Wis. 2d at 446-47, 293 N.W.2d at 519-21.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 448, 293 N.W.2d at 522.
132. 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982).
133. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West 1980).
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lier the court had held the original repose statute unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.1 3 4 The legislature subsequently cured the defect and
passed the statute anew. In Calder the court approved the new statute both
as to equal protection and due process considerations. 135 The court empha-
sized, however, that the new statute would violate due process if, in a partic-
ular case, it failed to provide a claimant with a reasonable time to seek a
remedy. 136
In a diversity action the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently consid-
ered the constitutionality of Ohio's ten-year construction industry statute of
repose. 137 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Lawrence 138 involved the collapse
of a roof more than ten years after its completion. The court upheld the
repose statute as a valid limitation on when a legally cognizable cause of
action may accrue. 139 Within the context of its due process discussion, how-
ever, the court stated that the statute might fail scrutiny if it were applied to
an injury occurring near the end of the statutory period.14°
III. THE FUTURE OF REPOSE STATUTES
The United States Supreme Court's statements on the reasonableness re-
quirement for statutes of limitation, coupled with lower court opinions on
unreasonably short repose periods, leave the Court with several alternatives
for resolving a due process challenge to a statute of repose. First, the Court
may hold statutes of repose per se unconstitutional. Such an approach is
unlikely since the Court has frequently endorsed the policies that underlie
statutory time bars.' 4 1
Second, the Court may hold repose statutes unconstitutional only in those
circumstances in which such statutes act as very abbreviated statutes of limi-
tation. Straightforward application of the constitutional principles the
Court has already announced with respect to statutes of limitation leads to-
ward such a result. 142 Inherent in such an approach, however, is the need
for the court to resolve what constitutes a reasonable time period for a plain-
tiff to commence an action already accrued.
Although judges are inclined to leave the determination of the appropriate
period to the legislature, the courts must ultimately pass on the constitution-
ality of the statutory period.143 The circumstances under which a cause of
action arises cannot be ignored in a judicial determination of reasonableness.
Obviously, the time required to commence a personal injury claim arising
out of a minor automobile collision is different from that required to investi-
134. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977).
135. 318 N.W.2d at 843-44.
136. Id. at 844.
137. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Baldwin 1971).
138. 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984).
139. Id. at 1373.
140. Id. at 1367 n.7.
141. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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gate and analyze potential claims resulting from a major industrial explo-
sion. The restriction placed on attorneys by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11144 may also provide an important benchmark in the definition of a rea-
sonable time for filing suit in federal court. Rule 11 prohibits attorneys from
filing frivolous claims and subjects them to sanctions for failure to ascertain
fully the validity of allegations they make on behalf of a client., 45 To avoid
conflict with rule 11 the definition of a reasonable period within which to file
suit thus must include time required for an attorney to investigate ade-
quately the culpability of suspected tortfeasors. Even if a state's rules of
procedure do not contain a provision analogous to rule 11, the state cannot
ignore the federal rule. Repose statutes, like statutes of limitation, are sub-
stantive laws under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.' 46 Under Erie federal
courts sitting in diversity actions must apply state substantive law unless it
directly conflicts with federal procedural law. 147 State legislatures thus must
provide flexibility in the application of repose time bars in order to avoid a
direct conflict between the statutory time deadline and the reasonable time
requirement implicit in rule 11.
In the absence of a ruling on repose statutes by the high Court, state
courts will increasingly require legislatures to reconsider the fairness and
constitutionality of strict application of statutes of repose. In recognition of
the inequities that can result from repose statutes, some states have already
included grace periods that extend the repose deadline for causes of action
accruing shortly before the time bar.' 48 The Tennessee Legislature, for ex-
ample, adopted a four-year statute of repose to limit liability arising out of
design and construction defects. 149 The statute also provided, however, an
additional year for commencement of suit if property damage or personal
injury occurred during the fourth year after substantial completion of the
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
145. Id.
146. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (state substantive law applies in diversity cases); see Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 740 F.2d 1362, 1365 (6th Cir. 1984).
147. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern
when in direct conflict with state statute); see Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-
50, 750 n.9 (1980) (reaffirming Hanna analysis, but applying state statute of limitations be-
cause the Court found no direct conflict between the state statute and FED. R. CIv. P. 3); see
also Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305, 307-09 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussion of
the differences between the Hanna and Erie- Walker analyses of conflicts between federal and
state procedural law).
148. E.g., Illinois' statute provides that:
No action ... may be brought ... after 12 years have elapsed from the time of
such act or omission. However, any person who discovers such act or omission
prior to expiration of 12 years from the time of such act or omission shall in no
event have less than 2 years to bring an action ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-214(b) (Smith-Hurd 1982). The Texas statute contains a time
bar after ten years from the date of substantial completion. It provides, however, that "[i]f the
claimant presents a written claim for damages, contribution, or indemnity to the architect or
engineer within the 10-year limitations period, the period is extended for two years from the
day the claim is presented." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.008 (1986). For
additional examples of grace periods, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 337. l(3)(b) (West
1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44(2) (1974). See supra note 33 regarding other types of
statutory provisions designed to mitigate the harsh effects of repose statutes.
149. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-314 (1965).
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construction.1 50 Interpreting the repose statute, the Tennessee Supreme
Court said that the grace period serves to prevent the patent injustice that
would result if a cause of action accrues during the last year of the statutory
period. 151
Product liability statutes may also contain adjustments similar to such
grace periods. For example, the Model Uniform Product Liability Act' 52
and Kentucky's Product Liability Act 53 avoid a strict repose time bar by
establishing a rebuttable presumption against product defectiveness. This
presumption allows the plaintiff to commence an action after the statutory
period, but also requires the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving that the
injury resulted from a defect in the product itself rather than from misuse of
the product.
Any statutory scheme endorsed by the Supreme Court should strike a bal-
ance between the important social policies, such as barring stale claims, that
repose statutes are designed to promote and plaintiffs' due process right of
reasonable access to the courts. Such a compromise would require the reten-
tion of a statutory time bar to prevent indefinite potential liability of mem-.
bers of the construction and manufacturing industries. The time bar must,
however, be tempered by a mechanism such as a grace period or a rebuttable
presumption provision in order to prevent industry members from com-
pletely escaping their liability to plaintiffs whose causes of action accrue
shortly before the time bar attaches. A grace period would provide plaintiffs
with a reasonable opportunity to institute a proceeding on their vested cause
of action, and, thus, would preserve the plaintiffs' due process right of access
to the courts. Similarly, providing plaintiffs the opportunity, after a statu-
tory repose period has passed, to rebut a presumption of defendant nonliabil-
ity should also solve the due process problem as long as the burden of proof
placed on the plaintiff is not so overwhelming as to constitute a denial of
access to the courts.
The grace period approach would favor defendants in that the term of
their potential liability would extend for only a relatively brief time beyond
150. Id. § 28-315.
151. Watts v. Putnam County, 525 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tenn. 1975).
152. MODEL UPLA § 110(B)(1), supra note 20, at 62,732 (proposed statute of repose pro-
vides: "In claims that involve harm caused more than ten (10) years after time of delivery, a
presumption arises that the harm was caused after the useful safe life expired. This presump-
tion may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence."). The Model UPLA is the result
of an eighteen-month study commissioned by the Commerce Department for the purpose of
determining problems in, and possible solutions to, tort litigation of product liability claims.
The Commerce Department presented the model code in the interest of introducing uniformity
and stability into product liability tort law. MODEL UPLA, supra note 20, at 62,714. See
generally, Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Products Liability Law-A Rush to
Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221 (1979) (discussion of the Commerce Department's pro-
posed model code).
153. Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.310(1) (1978) provides:
(1) In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, that the subject product was not
defective if the injury, death or property damage occurred either more than five
(5) years after the date of sale to the first consumer or more than eight (8) years
after the date of manufacture.
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the statutory repose period. For example, a one-year grace period added to a
five-year statute of repose would bar the commencement of a suit at six years
after completion of construction or manufacture. The rebuttable presump-
tion approach, on the other hand, would probably tend to favor plaintiffs. If
a latent defect manifested itself after the repose period, the plaintiff could,
with sufficient evidence, overcome the presumption that the defect was due
to misuse rather than negligent manufacture or construction. The Court
could allow the states latitude in selecting the grace period, rebuttable pre-
sumption, or some third approach for providing plaintiffs access to the
courts. Statutes of repose without some such mechanism for ameliorating
their harsh effects, however, should be declared unconstitutional as a depri-
vation of due process. 154
154. Implying a grace period or holding the strict application of a statute of repose uncon-
stitutional would not violate the defendant's constitutional rights through the impermissible
retroactive effect of lifting the time bar. The defendant does not have a constitutional right to
be free from liability. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 316 (1945); see
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628-29 (1885) (state legislature may constitutionally restore to
the plaintiff his remedy by repeal or extension of a lapsed statute of limitations so long as the
lapse has not conferred on the defendant title to real or personal property). In Chase the Court
declined to overrule Campbell and refused to find the Minnesota legislature's passage of a
special retroactive statute of limitations, MINN. STAT. § 3996-24 (Supp. 1941), an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of the defendant's fourteenth amendment rights. 325 U.S. at 315-16; see
McGovern, supra note 8, at 615.
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